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Forms of fettering: Application forms and the exercise of 




Application forms are often the compulsory interface between citizens and their social rights. 
Applicants for support must navigate the questions, checklists and blank spaces in often long, 
detailed documents to assert their social entitlements. Given their ubiquity and the central role 
they play in the administration of the welfare state, it is perhaps surprising that they have been 
neglected in favour of a focus on other documentation, principally policy and guidance. This 
paper argues that the non-fettering ground of review – a principle whose jurisprudence is tied 
to the design and use of policy – also engages application forms. Through an analysis of 271 
application forms used to administer the localised Discretionary Housing Payment scheme in 
England, three examples of their fettering potential are provided: the imposition of exhaustive 
criteria; requiring the applicant to self-classify or disclose irrelevant considerations; and 
constraining responses through tied evidential requirements. By arguing that the non-fettering 
ground should not limit itself to one kind of document (policy) when administrators are so 
reliant on another (application forms), the paper’s broader agenda is to argue that principles of 
good administration should apply to all documentation used to administer social entitlement. 





                                                             





Application forms are central to the administration of the welfare state. For the vast majority 
of working-age benefits in the UK and across Europe, they are the compulsory interface 
between claimants and social security support. The content of these forms is therefore vital: 
the questions asked, evidence required, or the formatting of checklists and tables can all act to 
constrain or shape an applicant’s response and colour an administrative worker’s exercise of 
discretion. Far from banal paperwork or ‘mundane artefacts’ (Harper, 1998, p. 13) – 
engendering the ‘routine responses’ (Brenneis, 2006, p. 42) or ‘sheer indifference’ (Jacob, 
2007, p. 258) so often analysed in studies of forms and form-filling – these are high-stakes 
documents. An error in a form’s completion, such as omitting required evidence or neglecting 
to answer questions, can lead to destitution. 
 
Despite the importance of these forms in the administration of the welfare state and a material 
turn in much socio-legal scholarship (Riles, 2006; Pottage, 2012), there has been no sustained 
analysis of application forms. Administrative lawyers and the courts have trained their attention 
on other documentation – principally policies and guidance – or have subsumed their analyses 
into broader assessments of the routines and coping mechanisms of street-level bureaucrats 
(Adler, 2010).  Through a ‘form-led analysis’ (Singh, 2017, p. 536) of 271 ‘discretionary 
housing payment’ (DHP) application forms in England, this paper argues that the non-fettering 
principle used to interrogate the formation and application of policies, also engages the design 
and use of application forms. 
 
The argument falls into four sections. The first outlines how the principles that have evolved 
to assess the fettering of discretion through one form of document – policy – apply to another 
– application forms. The second considers the statutory basis of different application forms in 
the administration of social entitlement. The third provides context on the DHP scheme and 
argues for the central role of application forms within it. The fourth draws on an analysis of 
271 DHP application forms to provide three examples of their fettering potential: imposing 
exhaustive criteria, self-classification or the assessment of irrelevant considerations, and the 
imposition of evidential requirements. 
 
There is also a broader agenda here. If, as Stark argues, grounds of review serve to send a 
‘message’ to administrators (Stark, 2019, p. 16), it would be perverse for the non-fettering 
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ground to limit itself to one form of document (policy) when welfare bureaucracy and its 
administrators are also so reliant on another (application forms). By demonstrating how 
application forms can engage the same non-fettering principles as policy, the message sent is 
that the careful wording or ‘judge-proof[ing]’ of policies are not enough (Knight, 2009, p. 80) 
– principles of good administration should apply to all documentation used to administer social 
entitlement. 
 
Non-fettering principles and application forms 
After a spell in the wilderness, the non-fettering principle has had somewhat of an academic 
resurgence. Perry has advocated recently for its continued utility in administrative law (Perry, 
2017), McHarg is less convinced (2017). Stark builds on both to offer what she describes as a 
‘third option’ (Stark, 2019, p. 2), demonstrating how the non-fettering ground can stand-alone 
coherently, alongside legitimate expectations and the emerging principle of ‘consistency’ in 
the application of policy. What all analyses have in common is a recognition that the courts 
have built the fettering ground of review on one type of document: policy. Indeed, the 
seemingly restricted ambit of the ground has leveraged semantic arguments about what a 
‘policy’ actually is, such as Goudie QC’s (unsuccessful) assertion that as ‘the jurisprudence 
about fettering discretion relates to the creation and operation of a “policy”’, the principle is 
incapable of applying to a ‘one-off’ decision (R (Luton Borough Council v The Secretary of 
State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin) [54]).  
The principles at play get their teeth from the capacity of policies – detailing overarching rules, 
benchmarks, considerations, and so on – to constrain the ambit of a discretsionary decision. 
The basic position of the law can be put briefly: where a decision-maker has been conferred a 
discretionary power by statute, they must not disable themselves from exercising it through 
rigid adherence to policy. This constraint is ‘crucial’, as without it public decision-makers 
could fail to have regard to what affected persons ‘have to say’ and/or relevant factors (R (West 
Berkshire District Council and another) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2016] EWCA Civ 441 [19]). As argued by McHarg, the focus of the courts is not 
on whether the adoption of a policy is lawful per se, but rather on its capacity to structure the 
discretion of the decision-maker (McHarg, 2017, p. 273). A policy should ‘not be so rigid’ that 
it amounts to a decision in advance (R. (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 [21]), but should instead admit of some flexibility and 
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‘ad-hoc’ exceptions. Put another way, policies should operate as ‘rules of thumb’ (Perry, 2017, 
p. 381). 
At the core of this approach is a concern with the capacity of a non-human actor (here, a 
document outlining policy) to constrain the discretion of a human decision-maker. This concern 
animates all non-fettering principles regardless of jurisdiction. Kunnecke notes the ‘striking’ 
similarity between the English and German courts’ approaches (Künnecke, 2007, p. 91) and 
Pottie and Sossin’s observations of the court’s concern with ‘the language of…policy 
statement[s]’ applies as much to the UK as it does to their Canadian examples (Pottie and 
Sossin, 2005, p. 155). 
There is little doubt these policy documents occupy a high profile in the decisions of those 
administering social entitlement. Indeed, evidence suggests they are far more important to 
decision makers than any underpinning legislation conferring the discretionary power. There 
is little appreciation of the hierarchy of public law instruments in welfare bureaucracies: front-
line decision-makers ‘seldom’ utilise legislation, relying heavily on policies and guidance 
(Pottie and Sossin, 2005, p. 152), perhaps best illustrated by O’Brien’s memorable case study 
featuring a decision-maker proclaiming, ‘we don’t look at the law, just the guidance’ (2017, p. 
207). 
In the administration of social entitlement, however, policies and guidance only provide a 
partial picture of the non-human actors that impact decision-making. Documents are ‘potent’ 
in the field of social welfare (Carr, 2016, p. 215). There is a rich literature analysing face-to-
face interactions with street level bureaucrats (Hoag, 2011, p. 84) and administrative law 
scholars are increasing alive to the challenges posed by algorithms or other technological 
decision-making tools (Oswald, 2018). An applicant for social assistance, however, is far more 
likely to engage only with ‘paperwork hurdles’ (O’Brien, 2017, p. 234) – principally the 
humble application form, with its questions, tables, and checklists, structuring both the 
information provided to the decision-maker and their subsequent decision. These documents, 
although subject to far less analysis than those detailing policy, are the compulsory interface 
between the citizen and their access to social security, operationalising the overarching policy 
that is so often subject to the fettering concern. In other words, these documents are policy 
made manifest. To perhaps overstretch Lord Reid’s metaphor in British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v 
Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610, if a decision-maker should not ‘shut his ears’ to an 
application (p. 624), it is these forms which are doing the listening. 
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Many of the virtues that the courts ascribe to policy and guidance apply to the use of application 
forms. They help to ensure both ‘coherent and consistent’ decision-making (R. v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p. Holdings & Barnes Plc (the 
Alconbury case) [2001] UKHL 23 [2002] Env. L.R. 12 [143]), and feed into ‘utilitarian 
considerations’ of ‘efficient administration’ which are so acute in the context of ‘social welfare’ 
(Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 5 [2003] 2 A.C. 430 
[43]). In much the same way that adopting policies to guide the exercise of a discretion is 
‘perfectly proper’ (Alconbury, [143]), so too is the use of other forms of documentation – here, 
application forms – to structure decision-making. 
I argue, however, the ‘underpinning’ principles that animate the fettering ground of review 
(Stark, 2019, p. 13) also apply. If the case law on fettering a discretion is, at its root, concerned 
with the impact of non-human actors on decision-making, whether a discretion is fettered by 
virtue of a ‘policy’, or whether by an application form required of applicants, the same 
principles apply. Both documents attain their capacity to fetter through their ability to prevent 
the consideration of ad-hoc exceptions. Although the mechanism may be different (more on 
that below), the output is the same: an application form can fetter a discretion as much as a 
policy can. Application forms can engage these underlying principles in two key instances: (i) 
fettering a discretion in fact, and (ii) determining (ir)relevant considerations. 
I. Fettering a discretion in fact 
Policies and application forms often exist in symbiosis. Those broad statements and principles 
contained in policies and guidance are often phrased delicately to ensure they are ‘judge-
proofed’ or ‘bullet-proofed’ against challenges (Knight, 2009, p. 80; Halliday, 2004, p. 63-64). 
For instance, it is not unusual for DHP policies to refer explicitly to the need to avoid fettering 
discretion (York City Council, 2018, p. 4). These overarching statements become material 
when designing a form which captures the information required to process an application. As 
Stark argues, under the non-fettering ground, the court will look ‘behind the form of a policy 
to its operation in substance’ (Stark, 2019, p. 28). Knight’s distinction between fettering in law 
and fact is helpful here (Knight, 2009, p. 78).  An authority may, for instance, have a restrictive 
policy that is applied flexibly or vice-versa. The courts have looked at descriptive statistics or 
other documentary evidence (such as decision letters) to evidence where a prima facie lawful 
policy admitting of exceptions has been applied unlawfully in a ‘hard edged way’ (see R (on 
the application of Luton Borough Council) v The Secretary of State for Education [2011] 
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EWHC 217 (Admin) [61]). Even in the face of a seemingly strict policy, the court must be 
satisfied that there is a procedure and ‘genuine willingness to consider individual cases’, not 
simply a ‘rigid adherence to their policy’ at all costs (R v London Borough of Bexley [1995] 
E.L.R. 42 [55]). Application forms can serve to identify these distinctions, demonstrating 
where a policy which may not prima facie fetter unlawfully, may be fettering in fact. 
The paper turns to some examples of this shortly, but to provide a general demonstration of the 
point, consider that a local authority adopts a policy to award hardship payments to claimants 
who fall into certain pre-determined classes of ‘exceptional circumstances’. It is well 
established that a policy-maker can express such a policy in unqualified terms, provided 
procedures exist to admit of exceptions to prima facie bright-line rules (West Berkshire [17]; 
and Ex p. Jones [1995] E.L.R. 42). To apply for access to the fund, all claimants must complete 
an application form. This form provides a finite list of five circumstances – passported from 
the policy – in a checklist format. The applicant is required to tick which applies. Here, in 
practice, they have no ‘exceptions procedure worth the name’ (R v London Borough of Bexley 
[1995] E.L.R. 42 [55]), the form instead details a constrained, pre-determined exhaustive list. 
The application form demonstrates that the policy is being applied rigidly, does not in fact 
admit of exceptions, and is in turn fettering the exercise of discretion by the administrative 
worker. 
II. Determining (ir)relevant considerations 
Second, at their core, application forms are a means of capturing and shaping information for 
an administrative worker tasked with a decision. The questions, checklists, tables and so on, 
all control the range of factors available for the decision-maker to take into account at the point 
of their determination. Although policies are often heralded as a means of making it ‘harder…to 
take irrelevant considerations into account’ (Stark, 2019, p. 18), the courts have looked at the 
extent to which the discounting of factors can constrain decision-making. Policies which 
‘prevent the [decision-maker] taking into account a relevant consideration’ can unlawfully 
fetter a discretion (See R (on the application of Adath Yisroel Burial Society) v HM Senior 
Coroner for Inner North London [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) [87]). 
The same principle applies to the design of application forms. An application process prevents 
the consideration of important relevant factors is one which is capable of fettering a subsequent 
discretionary decision. This also works the other way around. This is not just about factors that 
are neglected within documentation, but also about the considerations implied through 
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questions on these forms. To ask a question as part of an application implies its relevance for 
subsequent decision-making. Otherwise, why ask it? This too can serve to illustrate irrelevant 
considerations being accounted for in the exercise of a discretionary power. This approach has 
emerged in challenges to the administration of the DHP scheme. In R (on the Application of 
Halvai) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham [2017] EWHC 802 (Admin), the 
applicant had answered questions on a DHP application form about the difficulty of sourcing 
alternative accommodation as a result of her disabilities and the significant extent of 
adaptations made to her property ([34]-[35]). However, the Court considered that there was ‘no 
evidence these matters’ had been considered ([37]), and that consequently Hammersmith and 
Fulham had ‘also erred in failing to take account of all the relevant factors and, specifically, 
these identified features of its own policy’ ([44]), reflected in the application form itself. 
 
Not all forms are created equal: Assessing statutory purpose 
 
The example used in this paper – application forms administering the localised DHP scheme – 
is admittedly a narrow one. Before launching into the details of the scheme, therefore, it is 
important to consider how the analysis may apply to other uses of application forms in the 
administration of social entitlement. As argued by Stark, when assessing the application of the 
non-fettering ground, ‘as ever, our starting point has to be the statutory purpose’ (Stark, 2019, 
p. 24). There is an important distinction drawn in law between fettering a discretion conferred 
by statute and one derived through a prerogative power (R (on the application of Sandiford) v 
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44 [61]-[62] (per 
Carnwath L and Mance L); Knight, 2009, p. 74-75). Although the use of application forms 
abound in the discharge of both, our focus here is on the former. The provision of DHPs and 
social security more broadly, and all the documentation that comes with it, is a statutory 
creature. If the principle against fettering discretion is concerned with the obligation to exercise 
discretion imposed by an ‘external originator’ (R (on the ssapplication of Sandiford) v The 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 581 [61]), then 
it is important to consider how the use and design of application forms vary in relation to the 
underpinning discretion conferred by statute. I argue the statutory context in which application 
forms are used varies in relation to two circumstances: the source of their design 
(centralised/decentralised) and the extent to which they simply transpose requirements laid out 
in legislation (prescribed/non-prescribed). 
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Most of the UK welfare state is administered using centralised and prescribed forms, designed 
by civil servants in government departments. This approach characterises two successor 
benefits introduced by the UK Government: Universal Credit and Personal Independence 
Payments (PIP). The drive for standardisation in the former has led to the ‘digital by default’ 
design (Dwyer and Wright, 2014, p. 32-33) – underpinned by legislationi – where applicants 
must use a standardised online application form designed by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), derided by Seddon and O’Donovan as a ‘factory-style operation’ (2013, p. 
10). For PIP, all claims are also managed by the DWP with centrally designed forms (‘PIP1’ 
to screen applicants and the ‘PIP2 questionnaire’ to determine eligibility) issued and processed 
centrally. Of course, the central design of these forms does not make their interrogation any 
less important. The Government commissioned independent review underscored that the PIP2 
form is a ‘vital piece of evidence the importance of which should not be overlooked’ (Gray, 
2017, p. 6), with the Universal Credit application process having been subject to sustained 
criticism (Royston, 2017, p. 215-222; Dwyer and Wright, 2014, p. 32-33). 
Less common are prescribed, decentralised forms, where a tightly delineated statutory scheme 
is laid down by Government, but discretion in the design of the application process is conferred 
to decentralised agencies. For instance, the exhaustive requirements for English housing benefit 
applications are laid out under the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, but individual housing 
authorities design their own documentation to aid processing. Reg.83(1) only requires that 
claims are made by applicants on a ‘properly completed form’, which is only such if ‘it is 
completed in accordance with the instructions on the form, including any instructions to 
provide information and evidence in connection with the claim’ (Reg. 83(9) Housing Benefit 
Regulations 2006). The format and content of application forms is at the discretion of 
individual authorities leading to significanst variation in their composition (Seddon and 
O’Donovan, 2013, p. 11-16). 
Finally, application forms may be both decentralised and used to administer a non-prescribed 
entitlement, such as those designed in response to a broad discretionary power. The Council 
Tax Reduction Scheme, Local Welfare Assistance Schemes and – the focus of this paper – 
DHPs, are the most notable examples. For instance, the Council Tax Reduction Schemes 
(Prescribed Requirements) (England) Regulations 2012/2885 provide a broad discretion for 
local authorities to ‘reduce’ council tax (by awarding what would have otherwise been the 
predecessor council tax benefit); although requirements for pensioners are more tightly 
prescribed, the administration of the scheme for those of working age is a broad discretion 
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accompanied by Government guidance. The only substantive requirement made of application 
processes is that any associated forms are supplied ‘free of charge’ (s.3(2) Sch. 7 Council Tax 
Reduction Schemes (Prescribed Requirements) (England) Regulations 2012/2885). 
The DHP application form examples that follow are sited in this final de-centralised/non-
prescribed context. The analysis deals, therefore, with a broad-ranging conferral of discretion 
via statute to local authorities. The statutory scheme at play – outlined below – is less complex 
than in de-centralised/prescribed settings (such as housing benefit) where authorities are 
operating under far more constrained discretionary powers and where forms often transpose 
tightly delineated statutory criteria. Yet the DHP approach admits of far greater variation than 
prescribed/centralised contexts (such as Universal Credit), where only one centrally designed 
application form is used, not the variation we see below. It is important to caveat what follows, 
therefore, by underscoring that the fettering principle is a creature of the underpinning statutory 
schema, and may play out differently in centralised/prescribed and decentralised/prescribed 
contexts. 
 
Discretionary housing payments: A precis 
 
Having provided a broader assessment of the statutory context in which the design of these 
application forms sit, before turning to the examples it is important to provide some further 
detail on the DHP regime. Only key contextual issues are dealt with here, for a more 
comprehensive assessment readers are better served elsewhere (CCHPR, 2015; Meers, 2015). 
The scheme functions by the DWP allocating an annual budget – calculated with reference to 
a centralised formula – to Local Authorities across the United Kingdomii to provide ‘top-up’ 
payments to those in receipt of housing benefit who require additional assistance to meet their 
housing costs. The underpinning Discretionary Financial Assistance Regulations 2001/1167 
provide a broad discretion to local authorities in making awards, with three key limitations: (i) 
payments can only be made to those receiving Housing Benefit or the ‘relevant award of 
universal credit’ (ostensibly the ‘housing element’, Reg. 2(1)(a)), (ii) the local authority must 
be satisfied that the claimant requires ‘some further financial assistance in addition to the 
benefit to which they are entitled to meet their housing costs’ (Reg. 2(1)(b)), and (iii) payments 
cannot cover certain exempted areas, such as benefit sanctions, increases in rent due to arrears 
or service charges (Reg. 3). 
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The scheme has endured a dramatic evolution since its formation in 2001. From a small-scale 
discretionary fund, accounting for approximately £20 million per annum of expenditure across 
the UK in 2001/2002 (Leicester and Shaw, 2003, p. 5), the same regulations will now shoulder 
over £1 billion of expenditure over the course of this Parliament (HC Deb 22 June 2017, 
vol.626, col.230). This is as a result of the payments’ central role in mitigating reductions to 
housing benefit following the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work 
Act 2016; principally the so-called ‘bedroom tax’ policy, the benefit cap, and freezes to Local 
Housing Allowance (LHA), the form of housing benefit claimed in the private rented sector. 
Their availability to claimants affected by this suite of policies is more than mere gratuity. The 
payments are of considerable legal purchase in justifying the lawfulness of flagship welfare 
reforms. Reductions to housing benefit in the wake of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the 
Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 have been characterised by a relative lack of statutossry 
exemptions, instead relying on the inflated DHP scheme to provide support in the ‘kind of hard 
cases’ which are ‘so hard to define in statute’ and to ‘get the funds to the right people’ (HL 
Deb, 25 January 2016, c1131). This has resulted in some tightly drawn categories of claimants 
being exempted from policies in underpinning regulations, but the bulk left to rely on the 
discretionary scheme. For instance, the underpinning ‘bedroom tax’ regulations permit an 
additional room for those who require overnight care or cannot share a bedroom, but not others 
with a disability (Reg.B13 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006), and the benefit cap does not 
apply to those in receipt of guardian’s or carer’s allowance, but does to lone parents in receipt 
of child benefits (Reg.75F Housing Benefit Regulations 2006). 
Successive judicial review challenges, almost all rooted in arguing an unlawful breach of 
Article 14 ECHR taken with Article 1 of Protocol 1, have underscored that approach is 
structurally sound. The courts have found that it is reasonable for most classes of claimant – 
such as the broader group of tenants with disabilities affected by the ‘bedroom tax’ in R. (on 
the application of Carmichael) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58 – 
to ‘be considered on an individual basis under the DHP scheme’ ([53]), as opposed to having 
a right to a sum certain. 
Notwithstanding that these payments are the lynchpin of reductions to housing benefit, the 
administration of DHPs is notoriously ambiguous, being described frequently as a ‘postcode 
lottery’ (Work and Pensions Committee, 2016, p. 1, 16). The Government’s DHP guidance, 
though stretching to 56 pages, offers little in the way of substance, with general procedural 
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requirements to ‘on a case by case basis hav[e] regard to the purpose of those disability related 
benefits’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2016, p. 14), or that ‘regard should be given to 
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rutherford’ (Ibid, p. 33) sitting alongside generalities, such 
as ‘LAs may interpret [further financial assistance] however they wish, taking into 
consideration the claimant’s financial circumstances and any other relevant factors’ (Ibid, p. 
6). 
In practice, local authorities exercise their discretion through issuing application forms to 
claimants, with face-to-face assessments with administrative staff being very rare (CCHPR, 
2015, p. 37-46). These are not ‘blueprints for…conversations’ as is common in other studies 
of documentation (Singh, 2017, p. 515), nor are they standardised forms issued by the 
Government or an arms-length agency. As a result, there is significant variation across the 
forms sampled in this study. Conclusions others have drawn about the standardising effect of 
documentation or the role of forms as ‘instruments of devolution’ (Singh, 2017, p. 512) are 
based on an assessment of uniform documentation – here, hundreds of parallel forms co-exist 
for the same purpose. 
Analysing the forms 
There are 271 DHP application forms from English local authorities in the sample. These were 
collected by searching on each of the 324 English local authorities’ websites. Authorities fell 
into three categories: those with ‘paper’ forms, available to download and print; those with 
‘online’ forms, where the filler has to respond to questions in their browser, often only 
revealing later questions as earlier stages are answered; and those with ‘inaccessible’ forms, 
where the claimant has to login to a validated account with the authority or contact them via 
email/present at the office to attain documentation. The sample is comprised of the ‘paper’ and 
accessible ‘online’ forms. 
Figure 1 details the breakdown between these three categories and maps the local authorities 
involved in the study. The figure illustrates that there is a sizable geographical spread in the 







As the form samples were all publicly available documents, the research did not present any 
ethical dilemmas. Where online forms required the entry of data to proceed, input boxes were 
filled with placeholder text. If a valid address was required to proceed, the local authority office 
building was used, and if a valid national insurance number was required a placeholder 
(‘AB123456C’) was entered. No online forms were submitted, though some local authorities 
may be able to access partial completions. 
These sample forms were analysed in two stages. First, the following key characteristics were 
tracked across the sample: whether the application form (i) stated DHPs are paid for a fixed 
period/if these fixed periods are specified in a entry box; (ii) asks if family/friends can 
support/accommodate; (iii) requires applicants to place themselves in pre-determined 
categories; (iv) asks about belongings that could be sold; (v) or asks questions which imply the 
imposition of conditionality (e.g. what have you done to help yourself?). All of these factors 
are of particular theoretical interest following prior work by the Child Poverty Action Group 
in Carmichaeliii and previous work undertaken by the author on a slightly smaller, and older, 
Figure 1. DHP application form sample by local authority area and status. 
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sample of forms (Meers, 2018). The numbers of itemised headings in income/expenditure 
tables were also counted to provide an idea of the extent of the means assessment applicants 
were subjected to (i.e the level of detail demanded of their finances). Second, the forms were 
re-read to identify: (i) variants of these tracked characteristics (e.g. the way in which time 
periods for support were limited by the form), and (ii) other common patterns in the questions 
and formatting of the documents/online applications. 
 
To provide some context for the analysis that follows, Figure Two details some descriptors 
from the first stage of this analysis. How many of the tracked criteria the forms meet is detailed 
as the ‘count’ (i.e. the number of forms that meet no criteria, one criterion, two criteria, and so 
on). The remainder of the table indicates the amount of their DHP budget the relevant local 
authority spent in 2017/18. This is expressed both as a frequency and as a percentage of the 
total number of authorities exhibiting the same number of the tracked criteria (i.e. the 





The figure demonstrates the high prevalence of the criteria tracked in the first strand of the 
study – only 22 of the forms in the sample (8%) did not exhibit any. It also suggests modest 
variation in the expenditure of DHP budgets across Local Authorities present in the sample 
relative to the number of criteria satisfied by the forms. However, there is no clear evidence of 
a direct correlation between more criteria being satisfied and lower DHP budget expenditure. 
 
The analysis below draws out common themes from the sample and refers to the data on the 
key characteristics outlined above. As would be expected from a scheme characterised as 
‘postcode lottery’ (Work and Pensions Committee, 2016, pp. 1, 16), there are sizable variations 
Figure 2. Presence of tracked criteria in the forms and Local Authority DHP spend. 
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between authorities. The examination that follows is not exhaustive, but instead focuses on 
drawing out common themes following the two stages outlined above. The three areas 
examined below all demonstrate the fettering potential of application forms, dealing 
respectively with: imposing exhaustive criteria, self-classification/the assessment of irrelevant 
considerations, and the imposition of evidential requirements. 
 
Imposing exhaustive criteria 
 
Application forms are, by their nature, a ‘necessarily interactive’ (Brenneis, 2006, p. 42) feature 
of claiming welfare assistance. The questions, checklists, and empty boxes are presented as a 
‘discretionary move’ on the part of the form filler, inviting choice on how to respond (Reed, 
2006, p. 168). However, in limiting the information the form-filler can provide to the format 
of the form, it is what Cowan and Halliday describe as a ‘coerced choice’ (2003, p. 145, 207), 
sometimes referred to in earlier analyses of bureaucracy as ‘constrained choice’ (Bush & 
Gordon, 1978, p. 22). Some constraint is an administrative reality; checklists, tables and other 
formats are useful administrative tools – otherwise, we are left simply with large spaces to 
input text that does little to assist with administrative efficiency. However, in situations where 
an application form provides a limited set of options to the filler, the form can in effect impose 
an exhaustive set of criteria, fettering a subsequent discretion decision. 
 
A stark example of this is the inclusion of specified time periods for DHP awards. 21% of the 
sample forms provide some form of checklist delineating intervals for support, such as ‘4 weeks 
or 8 weeks’, or impose maximum time limits, most commonly, 26 weeks. 47% of the forms 
contain text that states DHPs are exclusively short-term and/or cannot be renewed indefinitely 










These time increments appear entirely arbitrary. This confinement of award length at the point 
of application sits oddly alongside the emphasis given by the Government on the possibility of 
‘indefinite’ awards for some claimants, particularly for those with long term or permanent 
disabilities (HC Deb, 13 March 2014, vol.577, col.405). The central DHP guidance itself states 
that there is ‘no limit’ on the length of awards (DWP, 2017) and government ministers have 
been at pains to underscore that ‘long term [DHP awards] can be made’ (HL Deb, 10 November 
2014, v757 c5), with it being ‘perfectly open’ to local authorities to make a ‘long term award 
where someone has a long-term condition’ (HC Deb, 28 October 2014, v586 c195). 
 
This is more than merely an indication of Government preference. The capacity of DHPs to  
mitigate housing benefit reductions in full for some classes of claimant with long-term needs 
has been a key plank of the Government’s defence of the scheme in high profile challenges to 
the ‘bedroom tax’ and benefit cap policies. In Carmichael, the court was satisfied that the 
broader class of disabled tenants affected by the bedroom tax could ‘be considered on an 
individual basis under the DHP scheme’ ([53]) and that consequently the Secretary of State’s 
decision to ‘structure the scheme as he did was reasonable.’ ([41]). The expectation is that local 
authorities will identify households which warrant mitigation and provide indefinite support 
under the scheme where appropriate, a reliance on what Brady characterises as ‘imaginary 
administrative decisions’ to avoid otherwise unlawful discrimination (Brady, 2012, pp. 6-7). 
 
The format of these forms, therefore, carry two key implications. First, by delineating time-
periods for support, the application form itself is severing the link between the applicants’ need 
and the administrative workers’ assessment. Applicants are either coerced into requesting a 
finite award, or cannot do otherwise, even where their circumstances (such as those with 
permanent disabilities) are likely to warrant indefinite support. Second, they carry a 
concomitant requirement to re-apply at the end of this prescribed period, compelling the 
applicant to complete the form again for another pre-determined fixed period to maintain 
support. Unlike other assessments of ‘applicant fatigue’, where claimants have to navigate 
several stages to attain support (Cowan & Halliday, 2003, p. 138-140), here it is the same stage 
having to be navigated at repeated intervals. 
 
More fundamentally, it is likely the approach of South Cambridgeshire Council in Figure 3 – 
replicated in 21% of the sample – falls foul of the principle against fettering discretion. By 
effectively limiting the time increment for support through the application form itself, the 
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authority is declining to exercise their discretion to make an indefinite award, particularly for 
those claimants with disabilities who led to the court’s emphasis on ‘individual evaluation’ 
under the DHP scheme in Carmichael ([61]-[62]). South Cambridge’s DHP policy states that 
‘the duration of an award shall be determined with regard to the particular circumstances of the 
case’ (South Cambridgeshire District Council, 2013, p. 2), yet – in fact – the application form 
enforces a finite, exhaustive list of time intervals. This definitive cut-off is to ‘shut [the 
administrative worker’s] ears to an application’ for longer support (British Oxygen Co Ltds v 
Board of Trade [1971] A.C. 610 [625]).  
 
Self-categorisation and (ir)relevant considerations 
 
DHP application forms provide further examples of imposing exhaustive criteria. Figure 4 
details instances of self-categorisation, where applicants are required to tick the relevant pre-
determined category to which they belong, and to elaborate – often within a tight space – on 
their membership of it. Such an approach was evident in 45% of the forms in the sample. An 
applicant may initially be struck by the haphazard arrangement of the different options 
presented, with little obvious connection between the items and missing categories which 
would appear to be warranted (for instance, if ‘short-term’ problems are a relevant category in 











This practice demonstrates that the DHP application forms are not mere ‘containers [or] 
vessels’ (Grabham, 2016, p. 33) for information, designed to communicate passively the basis 
of the individual’s application. Instead, the limited options offered restrict how the applicant 
can make their case for remaining in the property and require that they articulate it through the 
confines imposed by the form. An applicant affected by the ‘bedroom tax’ policy may have 
many reasons for wishing to remain in their current area: family ties, schooling, and caring 
responsibilities being three common motivations (Moffatt et al, 2015). The excerpt from 
Birmingham City Council’s application form, detailed in Figure 4, instead provides only one 
option, ‘living in this area means a better chance of obtaining or retaining employment’. In 
limiting responses in this way, these forms are doing more than trying to cater to a 
‘presupposed’ applicant (Jacob, 2007, p. 255). They are pre-determining finite ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, a process so often criticised by the courts when reflected in policies (R v 
London Borough of Bexley [1995] E.L.R. 42 [55]). 
 
The form excerpts in Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the other side of this phenomenon. Instead 
of limiting the provision of information by an applicant, the examples here instead require 
seemingly irrelevant information to be disclosed. Figure 5 focuses on two examples of this: 
questions about selling belongings/assets and financial support/alternative accommodation 
available from family and friends. These questions are asked of all the authority’s applicants, 











Figure 6 outlines the widespread imposition of conduct conditionality through DHP application 
forms. 77% of the forms in the sample included questions similar to those detailed here. Internal 
local authority policies have described the award of DHPs as ‘similar to the claimant 
commitment’ within Job Seeker’s Allowance/Universal Credit (City of Lincoln Council, 
2015), and the tying of conditions to awards as ‘good practice’ (Reading Borough Council, 
2015). These questions require applicants, both at the point of initial application and at each 
re-application, to respond to requests to substantiate their conduct or to detail what they have 











Both figures here demonstrate how application forms are capable of soliciting irrelevant 
considerations. The fettering principle at play – outlined above – is a straightforward one: ‘even 
a factor that may properly be taken into account…may become an unlawful fetter’ if it becomes 
‘a general rule that distorts the purpose of the statutory scheme’ (Woolf et al, 2018, at 9-008). 
The imposition of conduct conditionality – despite being widespread in the sample (present in 
77% of forms) – distorts the discretionary power conferred by the under-pinning Discretionary 
Financial Assistance Regulations 2001. Although these regulations confer a broad 
discretionary power to local authorities to persons who ‘appear…to require some further 
financial assistance…in order to meet housing costs’ (reg. 2(1)(b)), these questions in Figure 6 
do not deal with financial need at all, but instead prior conduct. They, in effect, ask if the 
applicant is ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ of assistance: if they cannot demonstrate they have 
helped themselves, why should the local authority assist? 
 
This practice also raises concerns over compound conditionality; namely, where conduct in 
one strand of welfare provision is contaminant with another. Conduct conditionality is already 
practised extensively in of out-of-work support (for recent work on Universal Credit and 
Jobseekers in particular, see Wright et al, 2018; and Stewart and Wright, 2018). Linking the 
satisfaction of one set of conditions – such as  Salford’s requirement in Figure 6 for the 
applicant to sign to allow contact with Job Centre Plus – with eligibility for DHP payments 
demonstrates how one ‘regime of conditionality’ can ‘compound’ vulnerabilities already 
experienced elsewhere (Fletcher et al, 2016, p. 171). Losing one could mean losing the other, 
despite both being statutory disparate and intended to address different needs. This practice is 
completely outside the scope of the Discretionary Financial Assistance Regulations, which 
focus entirely on financial need for housing costs. 
 
The questions outlined in Figure 5 – on selling belongings and living with/support from family 
members – continue this ‘deserving/undeserving’ distinction, which sits oddly alongside the 
DWP’s characterisation of the underpinning statutory purpose of DHPs in successive judicial 
review challenges. In the context of the ‘bedroom tax’ policy, in Carmichael, the majority of 
the UKSC agreed with the Government that those requiring an additional bedroom by reason 
of a disability, or as a result of being enrolled in a sanctuary scheme for victims of domestic 
violence, could ‘be considered on an individual basis under the DHP scheme’ as opposed to 
being subject to a statutory exemption from the policy (para.53). Questions about selling 
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belongings and soliciting money from family members demonstrate starkly the ‘stricter means 




Evidence is often analysed as a document in its own right, with studies focusing on how some 
documents can achieve ‘scientific authority’ (Biagioli, 2006, p. 127-128) over others. 
Grabham’s analysis of the work of medical reports to ‘instantiate’ the HIV virus in 
discrimination claims (Grabham, 2016, p. 70-72), or Valverde’s critique of police evidence on 
intoxication in prosecutions for impaired driving offences – particularly its uncertain status 
between ‘expert evidence’ or ‘eyewitness evidence’ (Valverde, 2003, p. 186-187) –  
demonstrate the value of this approach. However, in addition to existing as evidence in their 
own right, documents themselves are often used to enforce specific evidential requirements; 
namely, where one document requires others to be submitted alongside it in an application. 
 
These evidential requirements contained in documents can have acute effects. As a key barrier 
in the ‘bureaucratic hurdles’ to attain assistance (O’Brien, 2017, p. 6; Sossin, 2004, p. 365), the 
failure to submit required evidence – or, perhaps more accurately, the failure to identify 
correctly the evidence required of you and to be able to access it for submission – is fatal to a 
social security claim. O’Brien traces the role of a Government-created questionnaire for the 
‘genuine prospect of work test’, which directs its user to only two forms of permissible 
evidence (O’Brien, 2017: 143-144). Here, the document and its guidance is becoming 
‘determinative of outcomes, and of the law’ (ibid). Put another way, a failure to meet evidential 
requirements, because relevant documentation is not available or is engaged in a parallel 
application elsewhere in the social security system, is a form of ‘de facto disentitlement’ 
(Sossin, 2004, p. 365). Documentation and its implied or explicit evidential requirements can 
therefore constrain both the submission of applications and – where individual responses have 
to be evidenced – the material detailed in other questions or boxes. 
 
The data collected in the course of this study suggests that the operation of the DHP scheme 
by local authorities is tied to an expansive range of evidential requirements contained in 
application forms, with associated deadlines, documentation or conditionality. Two key 
evidential burdens are dealt with in turn: (i) requirements for income and expenditure evidence, 




Additional evidence on income and expenditure 
 
The application forms in the sample demand stringent evidence to support declared levels of 
income and expenditure. These include both specific requests for documents, particularly bank 
statements for the previous two months, and broader indefinite requests for simply ‘evidence’ 











Evidential requirements for income and savings information is not in of itself particularly 
noteworthy; it is a familiar practice for most non-contributory benefits in the UK social security 
system. As argued by Taylor-Gooby et al, within a liberal welfare state such as the UK, the 
‘traditional liberal solution’ to any problem is ‘extended means testing’ (2004, p. 573). An 
application for housing benefit carries with it a significant evidential burden, including two 
months’ of bank statements, evidence of rental liability and so on, to discharge the detailed 
requirements laid out in secondary legislation (see Part 6, Housing Benefit Regulations 
2006/213, mirrored broadly under Part 6 Universal Credit Regulations 2013/376). What is 
different here, however, is that it is not just income which needs to be evidenced, but also 
expenditure. 
 
Requiring evidence for all expenditure – as appears to be the case for Broxbourne Borough 
Council and Dudley Metropolitan Council's examples in Figure 7 – has the potential to fetter a 
discretion. It is not difficult to think of instances where it is not possible to evidence 
expenditure, particularly for those living on low incomes, where high levels of financial 
exclusion leads to higher cash expenditure patterns as opposed to the regular use of bank 
accounts (Bramley & Besemer, 2018, pp. 269-273; Tinsen et al, 2014, p. 9). A blanket 
requirement to evidence as default therefore puts applicants at a disadvantage in the assessment 




Having provided a series of examples specific to the administration of the DHP scheme, this 
concluding section revisits the broader arguments of the paper. First, application forms are 
documents that are capable of engaging the non-fettering ground of review. As policy made 
manifest, they can serve to demonstrate where a seemingly flexible rule is being implemented 
in a ‘hard-edged’ way, fetter a discretion by imposing exhaustive criteria of their own, and 
force the consideration of irrelevant considerations or omit relevant ones. Application forms 
used to administer the DHP scheme demonstrate this potential, with the forms themselves 
working to frustrate the discretion conferred to local authorities under the Discretionary 
Financial Assistance Regulations 2001. Indeed, the courts have already begun tentatively 






Second – following this first argument – scholarly attention needs training not only on the 
development of over-arching policies and guidance, but also on those application processes 
that are tied to them inexorably. Humble application forms, whether in hard-copy or imposed 
through an online process, are often the compulsory means through which claimants interact 
with the welfare state. Their existence is integral to the effective administration of the byzantine 
system of social entitlement, and they should not escape careful scrutiny in favour of a focus 
on other, more widely-analysed documents. 
Finally, as Stark argues, grounds of review inevitably send a message to administrators (Stark, 
2019, 16). To highlight that the non-fettering ground engages with other forms of 
documentation underscores that a well-crafted (or ‘judge-proofed’ (Knight, 2009, p. 80)) policy 
is not enough. An application form can evidence where ‘bullet-proofed’ (Halliday, 2004, p. 63-
64) guiding documentation can still, in fact, fall foul of the principles of good administration. 
Application processes themselves must be considered carefully to avoid falling foul of the same 
standards imposed on the drafting and use of policy. This is a message to administrators that 
reflects both the reality of administration in the welfare state, and the experiences of those 
claimants that have to navigate it repeatedly. As argued above, if a key principle of the fettering 
ground is that a decision make must not ‘shut his ears’ to an application, it is these oft-ignored 
application forms which are doing the listening. Scholars with an interest in welfare 
bureaucracy and administrative decision-making should recognise the importance of these 
seemingly mundane documents. 
Notes 
i See Reg.8(1) and Schedule Two, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker's Allowance and 
Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) Regulations 2013/380. Telephone 
applications are only possible under circumstances laid out in Reg.8(2). 
ii In Scotland, DHPs are a devolved matter and the mechanics of the scheme are different. Here, the 
Scottish Government provides additional funds to local authorities over and above those issued by the 
UK Government’s Department for Work and Pensions. 
iii The author thanks Sophie Earnshaw and Mike Spencer of the Child Poverty Action Group for sharing 
the data they collected in 2015. 
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